

The 10th Annual  
**Foucault Circle**

**ABSTRACTS**

**Morgan State University  
Baltimore, MD  
9-11 April 2010**

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### 1. IRAN, REVOLT EMANCIPATION

#### **Marcelo Irajá de Araujo Hoffman** **Population, Biopolitics and the Iranian Revolution**

Judging from the statements of some of Michel Foucault's most prominent and incisive interlocutors, it would be quite easy to get the impression that a consensus is somewhat lacking on the extent to which his concepts of biopolitics and biopower carried over into his subsequent work on governmentality in the late 1970s. Colin Gordon observes, "Foucault reintroduced this theme of biopower or biopolitics in his 1978 lectures, in a way linking it intimately with his approach to the theme of government". Antonio Negri suggests that Foucault retained the concept of biopolitics but changed its signification from a police technique to "*a political economy of life in general*". Michel Senellart offers a rather different gloss on this matter, submitting that the "center of gravity" shifted for Foucault from "the question of biopower to that of government, to such an extent that in the end the latter almost entirely eclipses the former". Notably, however, what all of these statements have in common is the view that Foucault held on to the concept of biopolitics, however tangentially, as his research pivoted increasingly around the concept of governmentality.

Against this view, I suggest that changes in Foucault's conception of population in the late 1970s entailed nothing short of his abandonment of biopolitics. A stark limitation to this concept arose from its reference to a conception of population as a mere object of biopolitical regulations rather than as a subject-object of these regulations. This rendering of population posed a major, if unstated, problem because it implied that biopolitics fell radically short of the productivity that had been one of the hallmarks of Foucault's thinking about power. Strangely, after imploring his readers to ascertain a productive view of power, Foucault seems to have ended up with a one-sided, if not negative, conception of power at the level of population. He rectified this problem by articulating population as a subject-object of security techniques correlative to liberal governmentality. Yet, the cost of this rectification was a full-fledged dissipation of his concept of biopolitics, owing to its reference to a limited conception of power underpinned by a view of population as a mere object.

What is more, the shift in Foucault's thinking about population seems to have yielded effects well beyond his presentation of a more productive modality of power. On the heels of his articulation of population as a subject-object, Foucault traveled to Iran twice to report on the revolution there for the Italian newspaper *Corriere della serra*. His reflections on the Iranian revolution appeared in the form of a series of articles and interviews in *Corriere della serra* as well as French and Persian publications from September 1978 to May 1979. These articles and interviews are widely regarded as problematic for the simple reason that they expressed a fascination, if not enthusiasm, for a revolution that resulted in the establishment of an oppressive theocratic regime. In the only book-length exposition of Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson even go so far as to castigate these analyses not only as an error in political judgment, but also as a symptom of a worldview that privileged tradition over modernity. One glaring problem with this argument is that "tradition" simply did not figure as a prominent or pertinent category for Foucault, and Afary and Anderson go no distance whatsoever in unpacking this category and revealing its utility for comprehending his analyses. I suggest that Foucault's analyses of the Iranian revolution can be more adequately understood against the background of his rethinking of population. More precisely, I submit that what served to fuel Foucault's enthusiasm with the Iranian revolution was his identification of the formation of a collective subject *irreducible* to population.

Matthew Lexow

The Unexplained Ground of Revolt: Foucault's Time in Iran

At the end of his engagement with the Iranian revolution, Michel Foucault described his own ethics as “antistrategic” and that one “must be respectful when a singularity arises.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Foucault’s fascination with the singular events in Iran express his own commitment to a unique form of intellectual engagement; but his fascination was also an expression of his own concern with the experience of revolt itself. That is to say, Foucault’s investigation of the Iranian Revolution is an investigation of those “confused voices” that may not reveal a deeper truth but nevertheless exist and strive against all that works to silence them.<sup>2</sup> In this essay, I investigate Foucault’s surprising turn toward an interpretation of the lived experience of the individual in revolt that simultaneously exposes a form of temporality unique to Foucault’s understanding of revolt.

In May 1979, Foucault wrote that those who were not concerned with the deep reasons or structure of the uprising in Iran but with “the manner in which it was lived [*vécu*]” found it striking because those in revolt “inscribed the figures of spirituality on the soil of politics.”<sup>3</sup> Foucault, then, appears to be explicitly concerned with the lived experience [*vécu*] of the individual in revolt rather than how the events in Iran compare to revolutionary forms. In other words, Foucault is concerned with the content of revolt and this content is paired with a form that is entirely unlike that which passes for revolutionary.

I believe that a key to this approach can be found in Foucault’s response to the question of what would happen in Iran with the shah removed from power, Foucault states: “There will come a moment when the phenomenon that we are trying to apprehend and which has so fascinated us - the revolutionary experience itself - will die out [*s’êteindra*]. . . At that point, different political forces, different tendencies will appear . . .”<sup>4</sup> In short, political processes, compromises, and agreements will extinguish the revolutionary “light that lit up in all of them [revolutionaries] and which bathed them at the same time” (*ibid*). Yet the question remains: what is the nature of this light that has bathed Iranian revolutionaries until the ousting of the shah, what is this fascinating phenomenon that can so easily be banalized by a return to politics as such? In a programmatic essay published in the midst of his Iranian investigations, Foucault offers his readers a clue to answering these questions. He claims that while the great ideologies of the world are undergoing their death throes, ideas are born not only from intellectuals, but also from those minorities who, “history has never allowed to speak or to be heard”; and it is precisely these minorities who reveal that, “There are more ideas on the ground [*terre*] than intellectuals often imagine. . . It is necessary to assist in the birth of these ideas and in the explosion of their force . . .”<sup>5</sup> In short, the light that bathed those Iranians in revolt illuminated an idea that remains unimagined in the mind of the intellectual: a lived experience that is not reducible to politics nor to an evolutionary unfolding of events. Instead, the singular experience of the individual in revolt reveals a temporality marked by rupture and discomfort.

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<sup>1</sup> Foucault, Michel. “Inutile de se soulever?” in *Dits et Écrits II*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001. 794. (English translation: “Is it Useless to Revolt?” Trans. Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson in “Appendix” in Afray, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson. *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005. 267.)

<sup>2</sup> “Inutile de se soulever?” 793/266.

<sup>3</sup> Foucault, Michel. “Inutile de se soulever?” in *Dits et Écrits II*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001. 792. (English translation: “Is it Useless to Revolt?” Trans. Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson in “Appendix” to Afray, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson. *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005. 264-65.

<sup>4</sup> Foucault, Michel. “L’esprit d’un monde sans esprit” in *Dits et Écrits II*. Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001. 750. (English translation: “Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit”. Trans. Alan Sheridan in “Appendix” to Afray, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson. *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005. 256)

<sup>5</sup> Foucault, Michel. “Les <<reportages>> d’idées” in *Dits et Écrits II*. Paris: Quatro Gallimard, 2001. 707. Translation my own.

**Dianna Taylor**

**Freedom as Work: Foucault and the Critical Theorists on Emancipatory Social Critique and Change**

In his essay, “The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The *Dialect of Enlightenment* in Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism,” Axel Honneth argues that Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s text, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, needs to be understood as a “world-disclosing critique.” Such a critique “opens new horizons of meaning within which it can show the extent to which given circumstances have a pathological character, where pathology refers to the existence of something “unwholesome,” “unhealthy,” or “anomalous” within a society’s “desires or interests,” as well as within the “mechanisms by which” those desires and interests “are generated” (p. 122) The aim of a world-disclosing critique is not to assert as truth an alternative perspective to replace the pathological one. Rather, such a critique “provokes a changed perception of parts of our apparently familiar lifeworld” which facilitates the identification of harmful practices that have heretofore been taken as both given and benign (p. 124). It aims, in other words, to bring about a shift in the reader’s perspective that promotes critical engagement with prevailing modes of thought and existence for the specific purpose of identifying harms.

Honneth argues that while the need for social criticism is clear enough, providing normative justification for and thereby legitimizing world-disclosing critique is, at face value, more difficult. On the one hand, justification that is generated from within the society that is being critiqued identifies with and therefore runs the risk of simply rearticulating the pathological norms and values of that society; on the other hand, external justification is “too distant,” potentially arrogant, and risks being appropriated “for purposes of manipulation” (p. 118). Yet Honneth ultimately asserts that justification is only a problem if world-disclosing critique proceeds on the basis of traditional “metaphysical presuppositions,” which, in fact, it does not. As Honneth describes it, the critique is not justified by way of “normative foundations,” but rather by way of an *effect* which manifests itself in reader. The validity of the insights into society that world-disclosing critiques offer is thus neither determined rationally nor contained within the terms of the critique itself. Rather, as Honneth writes, ‘new facts in social reality become visible, but the addressees can reach agreement on the “truth” of these facts only after they have examined, in light of competing value beliefs, their effects on the developmental direction of societies’ (p. 124).

Taken as a world-disclosing critique, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* aims to bring about a paradigm shift within its readers that promotes critical engagement with prevailing modes of thought and existence which is intended to facilitate identification of social pathology. It does not lay out for its readers how this pathology is to be confronted, and it leaves up to them whether and how they will confront it. As Honneth writes, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* “only evokes a new and unfamiliar perspective on our social world without at the same time providing social theoretical proof that things are actually that way. Hence the truth claim of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* will depend on whether in the future the members of the society it describes will one day agree to accept its new descriptions, and thus change their social praxis of life” (p. 126).

I believe Honneth’s reading of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a world-disclosing critique has important implications for interpreting the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s work is frequently assailed by critics for lacking the normative foundations that emancipatory ethical and political philosophy is said to require, and is therefore viewed ethically and politically not only as inefficacious but also as potentially harmful. The existence of an intellectual affinity between the work of Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic* and the work of Foucault, however, lends support for the idea that Foucault’s work can be read as part of a tradition of thinkers who have identified precisely within the methodologies of social criticism themselves what in the language of critical theory is termed pathology and in Foucauldian terms is referred to as normalization. Such thinkers have sought alternative ways of conducting social criticism and, by extension, of countering pathology and normalization and promoting freedom. These alternative methodologies are considered to be ethically and politically irrelevant or harmful because they do not adhere to existing philosophical practice: their validity is located not in their foundations or governing principles, but rather in their effects – in the degree to which they facilitate the development of critical perspective or attitude that instigates new modes of thought and existence; they do not contain a prescriptive element, but rather offer “tools” which persons may take up or not. In conceiving freedom in terms of work to be done – work that can be encouraged but not demanded – their work contains an element of risk that from a traditional philosophical perspective appears dangerous but which they in fact illustrate must be

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run if social criticism is not merely to rearticulate the will to domination or normalization that it is endeavoring to combat.

This paper argues that an intellectual affinity does indeed exist between Foucault and Horkheimer and Adorno and assesses its significance for articulating emancipatory – in the form of counter-domination or anti-normalization – social criticism and promoting emancipatory social change. While there are a number of points of intersection in the work of these three thinkers that illustrate such an affinity, here I focus on Horkheimer and Adorno's and Foucault's respective critiques of the modern subject as presented in *Dialectic* and *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*. All three thinkers illustrate that the modern subject is characteristically self-sacrificing, and they also contend that efforts by the western philosophical tradition to counter the harmful nature of self-sacrifice simply rearticulate it. I then proceed to frame their work in the terms of world-disclosing critique (my point is not that Foucault's work is a world-disclosing critique as such, but rather that it operates along similar lines) in order to show that it is only through critical analysis of prevailing modes of social criticism – critical analysis that imparts responsibility for promoting social change onto its readers – that emancipatory social transformation is possible. That this insight is not unique to Foucault but is rather shared by other thinkers seeking to identify and counter the harms of modern societies indicates that it is not threatening to but rather crucial for emancipatory ethics and politics.

## 2. BIOPOLITICS AND NEO-LIBERALISM

### David Bleeden and Colby Lovins Locating Biopolitics in “The Birth of Biopolitics”

Michel Foucault entitled his 1979 *Collège de France* lecture course “The Birth of Biopolitics.” His initial goal for the course was to consider the “conditions of the possibility” leading to a significant shift in governmental technique which he had identified in his lecture courses of the previous two years—these years were 1976 and 1978, as he took a sabbatical in 1977—and in the last chapter of his book *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*. This shift, Foucault argues, is characterized by a change in the primary focus or object of government from the protection of geographic territory and the production of docile bodies, to the maintenance of the health of the ‘population’ inhabiting the bounded territory of the nation-state. It was, Foucault argued, a shift from the primacy of sovereign power, to what he called “biopower.”

In the previous two courses, entitled “Society Must Be Defended” and “Security, Territory and Population,” Foucault detailed and explicated the novel practices, technologies, concepts and characteristics of biopower. “The Birth of Biopolitics” was thus intended to develop and explain the conditions under which these became possible. To accomplish this, Foucault decided that he needed to further consider the development of the statistical concept ‘population’. Doing this, it turned out, required him to analyze the way that this concept emerged from and morphed in economic thought. As a result of this focus, “The Birth of Biopolitics” became a remarkably detailed and uncannily prescient reading of the emergence of European and North American neoliberalisms.

Throughout the analysis undertaken in “The Birth of Biopolitics,” Foucault reminds us that his goal is to get to and explain the conditions of the possibility of the emergence of biopower and thereby further our understanding of biopolitics. This, though, never happens. Instead, he ends the course apologizing for not having arrived where he had hoped and stating that even thinking that he could have gotten there without working through neoliberalism was impossible. The following year Foucault drops his analysis of biopower and focuses his attention on what he eventually calls “technologies of the self.”

Thus, the question remains open: what is the connection between neoliberalism and biopower. This project provides an answer to this question. Specifically, we argue that Foucault’s analysis implies that the emergence of the concept of ‘population’ out of developments in statistics made possible increasingly scientific techniques of management, particularly the management of commercial interests. We understand Foucault to be arguing that the intensification of such techniques, in turn, made possible the emergence of a scientific conception of ‘the market’ differing from that of classical economists, such as Smith and Riccardo, which relied on non-scientific metaphor for explanation, “the invisible hand” for example. Neoliberalism from the perspective of the argumentation provided in “The Birth of Biopolitics” can be conceived as the mapping of these scientific techniques of commercial management onto government, the latter understood as, and this differs depending upon which neoliberalism is considered, being in the service of, enhancing, protecting and/or producing this market. Given this, our argument is that Foucault’s argument in the 1979 lecture course implies that biopolitics dramatically intensifies with the emergence of neoliberalism. This is to say that as sovereignty wanes and biopower waxes, so too classical economics and neoliberalism. Thus, advanced neoliberal governmentality, to use Foucault’s now famous neologism, requires biopower and such power cannot intensify, at least in the manner that Foucault thinks that it has and likely will, without neoliberalism.

To make this argument we provide a three-part analysis, the first of which situates the 1979 lecture courses with respect to those leading to it. Based upon this, we detail the arguments made in the 1979 lecture course paying close attention to the points of intersection with the previous two lecture courses, the thinking of Gary Becker and Friedrich von Hayek, two of Foucault’s primary sources, and the places in the course where Foucault states that his point in developing neoliberalism is to explicate biopower and biopolitics. In the final and longest section, we employ the exposition of the first two parts of the analysis to develop and support our thesis.

**Andrew Dilts**

**From ‘entrepreneur of the self’ to ‘care of the self’: Neoliberal governmentality and Foucault’s ethics**

This paper asks how we should continue to read Foucault’s late work in light of his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France and Foucault’s awareness of and keen interest in neo-liberalism as a powerful form of governmental rationality. In these lectures, Foucault takes particular interest in the reconfiguration of quotidian practices in the American neo-liberal analysis of human capital, a revolutionary re-description of all activity as forms of personal investment, rendering all actors as entrepreneurs of the self. The March lectures in particular focus on the work of Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, who together laid out this radical account of human capital and applied it directly to spheres of social and political life traditionally taken to be outside the reach of economic analysis. Their own deployment of this account into domains like intimate family relations and state punishment brought them together under a rubric of what Foucault calls “environmental policy”: intervention in the rules of the game rather than on the players on the field.

In the early 1980s, Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* turned toward an account of the ethics of sexual practices in antiquity, ultimately centered on the development of the “cultivation” and “care” of the self. To this end, he identifies two central “factors” in this development are, interestingly, “changes in the marital practice and modifications in the rules of the political game.” These two “factors” pervade the work of Becker and Schultz, each of whom published extensively on marriage and whose redefinition of individuals as *homo oeconomicus* – as entrepreneurs of the self – provided the epistemological grounds for defining social policy as an “environmental policy.” Obviously, Schultz and Becker make no appearance in Foucault’s study of antiquity, but their presence can be felt in both in thematic overlap and content. In a gloss on Epictetus’ account of the emergence of the self and the practice of governance, Foucault writes, “It is the modality of a rational being and not the qualification of a status that establishes and ought to determine, in their concrete form, relations between the governors and the governed.” Five years earlier, Foucault gives a strikingly similar gloss on the neo-liberal figure of rationality *par excellence*: “[T]he surface of contact between the individual and the power exercised on him, and so the principle of the regulation of power over the individual, will be only this kind of grid of *homo oeconomicus*. *Homo oeconomicus* is the interface of government and the individual.”

Was the turn to ancient greek sexual ethics Foucault’s subtle but radical response to the rise of neo-liberal subjectivity? Is Foucault’s late work in ethical practice a rejection of neoliberalism rationality or is it a continuation of that project on more palatable or philosophical terms? This paper critiques Foucault’s account Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker’s theories of human capital as a basis for exploring the meaning and limits of Foucault’s final published works and analyzes the deployment of the “free market” (rather than the carceral, for instance) as the dominate *milieu* in which practices of the self must be performed, either ethically or economically.

**Stephanie Jenkins**

**Enabling Biopower**

Foucault’s work demands an account of ableism. For example, in the course summary for his 1974-1975 Collège de France lectures, Foucault writes, “We should study the appearance, at precise historical moments, of different institutions of rectification and the categories of individuals for who they are intended, that is to say, the technico-institutional births of blindness and deaf-muteness, of imbeciles and the retarded, of the nervous and unbalanced” (*Abnormal*, p. 325) While Foucault never explicitly addressed the norms of able-bodiedness, his writings are full of references to subjects othered as cognitively or physically abnormal. The plethora of applications of his genealogical works within Disability Studies documents the significance of his work to this field. However, rather than applying Foucault’s work to the topic of disability, I contend that reading Foucault’s work through the lens of disability will change how we read Foucault. My paper argues that ableism is more than a mere effect of biopower; it functions as a mechanism of biopower. My objective is to identify the need for a re-writing of the genealogy of biopower from the perspective of ability/disability.

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Contemporary Foucault scholars have analyzed racism as a mechanism of biopower, the logic that enables the workings of biopolitics. I will expand on these interpretations and argue that biopower also functions through the deployment of ableism, defined as a network of power relations that “devalues or differentiates disability through the valuation of able-bodiedness equated to normalcy.”<sup>6</sup> Biopower takes as its object, and produces as an effect, the normalized, abled body, defined according to its function, development, and capacity. This normalization of the abled, healthy body “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (*HSI*, 143). Ableism creates and maintains a division, classification, and hierarchization of the population according to expectations for bodily function and capacity. From this perspective, *bio-pouvoir* is the materialization and standardization of bodily abilities and affective into a politics of life. Any division between the normal/abnormal, abled/disabled, healthy/sick, and developed/degenerate takes the existence of bodily norms for granted. Such norms are historically constituted, yet they reveal what kinds of lives count as human in any given network of power/knowledge relations.

There has not yet been a prolonged study of ableism as a *mechanism* of biopower. Current research on Foucault, disability, and biopower treats disability or norms of embodiment as *effects* of biopower. In contrast, my reading accounts for ableism’s constitutive role in the production of other relations of power and domination. My paper will demonstrate the significance of this project for Foucault Studies and will conclude with a few brief remarks concerning directions for future research.

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<sup>6</sup> Fiona K. Campbell “Refusing Able(ness): A Preliminary Conversation about Ableism.” *M/C Journal* 11.3 (2008): online, under “Shifting the Gaze” subheading.



### 3. POWER-KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCIPLINE OF POPULATIONS

Matthew Chrulew

**Foucault and Hediger: Zoo Biopolitics and Power-Knowledge over Animals**

Heini Hediger was a Swiss zoologist who directed Zurich zoo from the mid twentieth century. His writings such as *Wild Animals in Captivity*, as well as practical interventions like his operational review of Sydney's Taronga Zoo, are foundational for the biopolitical reforms at the basis of modern methods of welfare-centred zookeeping. In a context of high mortality rates, failure to breed, and repetitive, stressed animal behavior, on the basis of long-term, species-specific observation and experimentation, Hediger set down guidelines for the production of healthy, happy animals willing to breed and display natural behaviours, and thereby laid the groundwork for contemporary zoo biology and such practices as animal training, environmental enrichment, and captive breeding.

This paper will analyse Hediger's work in terms of Foucault's analytic model of power-knowledge and historical genealogy of pastoral power. In Hediger's work, concepts like 'flight distance' and 'critical distance' were used to refine architectural designs and management practices that targeted enclosure types and sizes, feeding programmes, and other elements of zookeeping protocol. I will argue that the knowledge produced in zoo biology and ethology (the science of animal behaviour) was reliant on, and also fed back into, the practices of animal keeping, that is, the power regime of confinement, discipline, and bio- power impacting on animal bodies and 'souls.' The post-war practices of biologically productive zookeeping are instances of the emergence within human-animal relations of what Foucault described in *The Will to Knowledge* as the twin poles of the biopolitics of the population and the anatomo-politics of the body. As Hediger wrote, 'the animals in a modern zoo require a thousand and one small, seemingly insignificant attentions and we must constantly strive to discover their needs.' In such highly detailed and individualised zoological care, the 'pastoral power' described by Foucault in the late seventies is returned to its biological roots.

This analysis will seek to make a number of interventions. It will firstly suggest to Foucault scholars the usefulness of his work in the emergent interdisciplinary field of animal studies. It will insist on an important element of biopolitics – that (pernicious effects notwithstanding) its political investment in life is devoted to health, growth, and happiness – that has been marginalised from contemporary debates, particularly following Giorgio Agamben's work on 'bare life.' It will contest a tendency in work on zoological gardens to focus on the elements of representation and spectacle (as instantiations of human voyeurism), to the neglect of specific apparatuses of power and their material effects on animal bodies. Similarly, it will contend, against the common biosemiotic reading of Hediger's work, that power-relations are prior to interspecies communication.

It will also further an ongoing argument that a Foucauldian attention to power relations, as part of a materialist genealogy of inscribed animal bodies, is indispensable to the theoretical strengthening of animal studies as a critical field.<sup>7</sup> Insofar as animal studies theorists have closely followed the late work of Derrida in focusing on animality in literary and philosophical texts (despite an avowed interest in institutional speciesism), they overlook what are the strongest tools in poststructuralist thought for the analysis of technologies of power and their connections to forms of knowledge. Rather than concentrating on the metaphysics of humanism and its exclusion of animality (as in Heidegger), what is needed is attention to the practical texts of animal-keeping guidance as in Hediger. Through an analysis of the applied and advisory texts of this eminent writer and

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<sup>7</sup> See Matthew Chrulew, 'From Zoo to Zoöpolis: Effectively Enacting Eden', in Ralph Acampora ed., *Zootopian Visions of Animal Encounter: Farewell to Noah* (Toposophia; Lexington Books, forthcoming 2010); see also Clare Palmer, 'Taming the Wild Profusion of Existing Things? A Study of Foucault, Power and Animals', *Environmental Ethics* 23:4 (2002): 339-358; Nicole Shukin, *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Posthumanities, 6; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

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zookeeper, this paper will demonstrate the strength of Foucault's thought for problematising the essential and pressing question of how we are to live with animals.

### **Sokthan Yeng** **State Racism and American Immigration**

When Representative Joseph Wilson interrupted President Obama's 2009 Congressional health care speech by accusing him of lying, he gave the public a glimpse of the logic behind state racism. He later apologized for his breach of decorum but maintained his dissatisfaction over the access illegal immigrants have to American health care. Because the bill under consideration does not extend health insurance to illegal immigrants and most illegal immigrants only get treatment in emergency rooms, Wilson seems to target emergency room services for illegal immigrants. This means that Wilson wants to withhold from illegal immigrants medical services that cannot be legally denied to any *person*. The justification behind this discrimination is that illegal immigrants use this loophole to take advantage of American resources. An uglier reading of these sentiments reveals the attempt to make certain people disposable in the name of protecting the political state. This shows that public discourse is beginning to align with philosophical analyses of state racism as described by Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, and Michel Foucault.

Although Agamben is the only one to connect policies surrounding migration into America with state racism, he continues to use the Holocaust as the reference for modern racism. I suggest that Foucault's philosophical framework can best show how American immigration policies connect to state racism, even if his main example also leaves something to be desired. Arendt, Agamben, and Foucault all aim to expose how everyone's worth depends upon their perceived contribution to or hindrance of state prosperity. I argue, however, that the prime examples of each obscure part of the philosophy behind state racism. By analyzing the Holocaust, Arendt and Agamben demonstrate that states can unite disparate subsections of the population under the umbrella of political threat. This example makes clear the state's ability to devalue human beings and eventually exterminate them simply by depicting them as cancers to the state. What is not clear is that everyone is evaluated along the lines of state racism, even when they are not expelled or murdered. Foucault's reading of state racism through sexuality creates the inverse problem. He was successful in elucidating how sexual norms are used to identify not only the sick but also the healthy individual. Sexual norms help place *everyone* along a spectrum of health and, ultimately, worth. Yet he himself complained that readers ignored how his treatise on sexuality connected to his larger thesis on state racism. Lost was Foucault's idea that states invested in particular sexual norms in order to cultivate a population of individuals who best served national interests. I suggest that applying Foucault's philosophical framework to American immigration elucidates the fullness of his theories. Because Foucault's work on modern racism is not fixed to one particular example, it can be better transplanted and applied to American immigration policies. By analyzing the discourse surrounding American immigration, we gain a more complete picture of state racism. The language of American immigration debates reveals what kind of individuals the political state believes are valuable to the nation's health and prosperity. While these distinctions of human worth are made clear through the immigration process, they can be applied to the entire American population.

### **Steve Tammelleo** **Student Evaluations as Disciplinary Regime**

Drawing upon Foucault's concept of disciplinary power, I argue that student evaluations exert a normalizing pressure on instructors that radically alters interactions between instructors and students. Among other things, the implementation of student evaluations encourages instructors to do all of the following: change the content of their syllabus to emphasize readings or topics that students enjoy, reduce the requirements for a class below the university's expectations, fail to comply with the university's academic honesty guidelines, avoid political extremism and explosive political topics, encourage sympathetic students to take additional classes from

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the instructor, and allow students to write term papers on inappropriate topics. Instructors are innovative. They will create techniques of false compliance, misdirection, and manipulation uniquely suited for the particular demands of their university's surveillance network.

Given that student evaluations create normalizing pressure that in many ways corrupts instructors and the teaching environment, in the second half of the paper, I consider three partial solutions. First, I argue that single question evaluations provide instructors with greater autonomy and are preferable to multiple question evaluations. Second, I argue that one reason for the continuation of the tenure system is that tenure works to limit the influence of student evaluations on instructors' teaching. And, third I argue that Foucault's examination of Hellenistic practices of care of self can provide instructors with techniques to resist the pressures of student evaluations. More precisely, I argue that three Hellenistic practices, mentorship, daily mediation, and meditation on death, are three ways individuals can cultivate and intensify the relationship of the self to the self. Although these practices do not enable the instructors to escape disciplinary regimes, by strengthening and solidifying the self, these practices of caring for oneself may enable instructors to offer greater resistance to the normalizing pressure of student evaluations.

#### 4. METHOD

**Paolo Savoia**

**Government and Discipline in Foucault's Critique of Political Reason**

This paper deals with the relationships between the concepts of “government” and “discipline” in Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France in the 1970s, especially *Psychiatric Power* (1973/74) and *Security, Territory, Population* (1977/78). It claims that the relationship between these two concepts is neither one of conceptual incompatibility nor one of chronological succession in the development of his thought, but rather a relation of interdependence that needs to be pointed out and further articulated in order to understand and to pursue a critique of modern political reason.

In the first place, after having sketched the mechanics of the disciplinary power and the governmental power by referring to some key lectures of the 1970s, I discuss what Foucault calls a *logic of strategy*, and the example of the formation of the army in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, mentioned by Foucault both in the courses of 1973/74 and of 1977/78. It will result that the introduction of the concept of government should not be seen as a shift of paradigm in Foucault’s conception of power relations, but rather as a new tool of analysis which allows him to conceive his field of research as that of the intertwining dimensions of power, knowledge and ethics, understood as the relationships between the self and him or her self. In other words, the notion of government enlarges the scope of what is at stake in a power relation, because it is broader than that of discipline, but not at all incompatible with it.

In the second place, I use the concepts of government and discipline in order to better understand what Foucault called the “modern political rationality”, namely a permanent integration of the individuals within a totality and, *vice versa*, a way of governing a collectivity to regulate individuals, through a correlation between individualization and totalization. I will argue that these two correlative poles of political rationality can be found, as a series of conceptual couples, in all Foucault’s historical and political analysis, from anatomo-politics/bio-politics to normation/normalization. My claim is thus that the courses on the psychiatric power, including the one on the *Abnormal* (1974/75), are the place of the emergence of this double logic of political rationality, alongside with the first problematization of the notion of “government” as the one which opens up a new inquiry in the historical fields of immanence that link together specific forms of power, knowledge and the self.

**Jeffrey Bussolini**

**What is a Dispositive?**

The ongoing appearance of new lectures by Michel Foucault, as well as specific considerations by Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben, have pointed up an important conceptual distinction which has remained largely invisible up to this point: that between *appareil/apparato/apparatus* and *dispositif/dispositivo/dispositive*. The fact that formerly both terms have been translated as 'apparatus,' and that the recent English translation of Agamben's 'Dispositive' essay makes a severe error in doing so notwithstanding myriad considerations to the contrary in the essay itself, has given the term 'apparatus' a certain inertia and fashion in English-language scholarship that must now be re-evaluated next to the important conceptual specificity of the term 'dispositive.' In light of these considerations, this paper argues that the archaic English term 'dispositive' is the best alternative for rendering this term, as it maintains crucial etymological and conceptual ties occluded by 'apparatus.'

A first crucial consideration is that the terms *appareil* and *apparato*, etymologically much closer to 'apparatus,' are available in French and Italian and are, in fact, used in other locations by Foucault, Deleuze, and Agamben: the fact that they use *dispositif* and *dispositivo* as distinct from it is important, and merits attention. Foucault's increasing, and technical, use of the term in the lecture courses from 1976 on would seem to be an important shift worth analyzing. Second, *appareil* is used by Althusser in the famous formulation of the *appareils idéologiques d'État*, a usage that Foucault likely intended to distance himself from (this seems to be Deleuze's reading as well). Third, as seen in Agamben, the terms are diametrically opposed in a crucial legal meaning. This paper is devoted

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to a careful analysis of the conceptual differences between the terms especially in light of the increasing use of the term in the Collège de France lecture courses, Graham Burchell's brief considerations on rendering the term in the translation of *Abnormal*, and the meticulous considerations on the term and concept in Agamben's *Che cos'è un dispositivo?* and Gilles Deleuze's *Qu'est-ce que un dispositif?*

While Burchell points up the difference between the terms and avers that there is an issue of translation and philosophical interpretation at hand, he opts for 'apparatus,' largely since this was in the preponderance of prior translations and since he saw no evident or direct way to render it otherwise. While his point that this is in line with prior renderings is indeed a salient one, ongoing release of texts in which the difference grows increasingly evident makes this consideration a persistent, and indeed more vital, one (especially since *Abnormal* preceded the lecture courses, both chronologically and in terms of French and English release, in which *dispositif* comes to be a crucial *terme d'art* in Foucault). With *Il faut défendre la société; Sécurité, territoire, population* (where he spends a considerable amount of time elucidating what he calls the *dispositifs de sécurité*); *Naissance de la biopolitique; Du gouvernement des vivants*; and, to a lesser extent, *L'Herméneutique du Sujet*, Foucault makes increasing and concentrated use of the concept *dispositif*. Given the particular choice of this term over against *appareil*, and the associated difference in theory of state (*étatisation* in Foucault) from Althusser's (*appareils idéologiques d'État*), *dispositif* has an important specificity in this context--as distinct from the State itself, more distributed, and an important element of the theory of security and governmentality.

Deleuze is keenly aware of this distinction in his brief but important essay on Foucault's use of *dispositif*, indicating that Foucault uses the term in part to distinguish it from the ideological State apparatus, as well as to give it a more distributed and ontological sense. And, incidentally, he and Guattari use *appareil* for their concept of *appareil de capture* in *Mille plateaux*, hence another important distinction which is swept away when both are translated purely and simply as 'apparatus' (though, of course, Deleuze and Guattari don't seem to intend any more fealty to Althusser's term than Foucault does). The translation of Deleuze's *dispositif* essay also indicates an awareness of this distinction, as Timothy Armstrong chooses to render the term as 'social apparatus' to distinguish it from 'apparatus' itself, and indeed renders the title as "What is a *dispositif*?" to emphasize the key specificity of the term (like Burchell he notes the problematic issue of rendering the term). Agamben's essay is also exclusively devoted to Foucault's use of *dispositif*. He makes the claim that the concept is an important evolution from *positivité* earlier in Foucault's work, which he in turn traces to the (Hegelian) influence of Foucault's teacher and Collège de France precursor Jean Hyppolite. In addition to marking a conceptual lineage, these terms are important since they derive from the Latin terms *ponere* and *disponere*, which have a crucial ontological-material sense. Agamben also notes that *dispositif* has the legal meaning of the force or finding of a decision; in this regard 'apparatus' in English has the key weakness of meaning precisely the opposite--namely the 'fine print' and the notes, as opposed to the decision and the force of the decision itself. This means 'dispositive' maintains an important connection to the state of exception tradition (in Schmitt, Livy, Saint-Bonnet and others) which is consonant with Foucault's thought about war, *raison d'État*, and *coup d'État*, and which is specifically overlooked by the rendering as 'apparatus.'

A last important consideration regarding the dispositive, also pointed out by Agamben, is that *dispositif*, and its latinate precursors in *dispositio* and *disponere*, are renderings of the Greek term *oikonomia*, which occupies an important position in Foucault's considerations on the *oikonomia psuchon* and the economy of power. Although not pointed out formally by him, this connection was almost certainly known to Foucault, and may help to account for his increasing and distinct usage of the term *dispositif* as he tried to take account of the ways that the use of power took the form of an economy.

**Ricky Crano**

### **1651/1976: Genealogy, Virtuality, War**

In the *Society Must Be Defended* lectures of 1976, Foucault famously suggests that we grasp modern political society as a discreet extension of rather than a qualitative replacement for war-forged relations of power. A genealogical explication of the philosophical-juridical discourse of sovereignty, as well as of the various counter-discourses of war that appear along the way, thus occupies much of Foucault's lectures. 1651—the year of

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Hobbes' *Leviathan* and the end of the English civil war—marks the first crucial moment in the development of modern political philosophy. The liberal contract theory ushered in by Hobbes would quickly overtake those heterogeneous histories of conquest that had been fueling a decade's domestic unrest. Telescoping an immense temporal distance, Foucault reveals a remarkable solidarity with the radical Leveler and Digger movements of the mid-seventeenth century, a fundamental slippage between his position qua Hobbes and theirs. This slippage, this solidarity, I believe, is central to Foucault's genealogical method, which sets out to exhume and breathe new life into what has been bluntly subjugated by dominant discursive trends.

Setting out from Foucault's explication of Hobbes and his comments on method in *Society Must Be Defended*, this paper aims to develop the temporal ontology implicit in the genealogist's task. Repeating, for example, the Leveler-Digger mantra of race war, genealogy throws the contemporary—its regimes of power, its communicative apparatuses, its modes of perception—violently out of joint. In a word, it renews the demands of its co-conspirators and marries historical knowledge to political actions three centuries removed. Foucault's is thus an archetypical “untimely philosophy,” an enduring effort to regain a collectively and strategically forgotten past in such a way that it appears as both anachronistic and entirely new.

In “*Theatrum Philosophicum*,” a 1970 essay that remains curiously undervalued by many would-be heirs to the genealogical project, Foucault lays bare his debt to Deleuze's epochal rethinking of temporal experience and creative individuation. I argue here for further scholarly attention to the generative relationship between Foucault's archival research and Deleuze's “phantasmaphysics” of virtuality, difference, and repetition. In part, a Deleuzian ontology illuminates the material effects of intangible objects like memories, discourses, systems of knowledge, cultural histories, and so on. Deleuze's virtual-actual schema in fact underpins much of Foucault's genealogical work. In his lectures on Hobbes, for example, Foucault rebuffs unitary conceptions of power with a leap into a forgotten past—that is, the virtual—and a politicized recollection of a repressed body of knowledge. Genealogy, in short, means a war for the virtual conditions—battles, discursive regimes, social problematizations—which enable actual contemporary dynamics of power. For Foucault, it is a matter of reinscribing that virtual into the actual, or of actualizing that virtual—repeating a dangerously subversive knowledge—in a better and more politically productive way.

## 5. PLEASURE, SEXUALITY, POWER

**Margaret A. McLaren**

### Exploring Pleasure, Desire and Love in Foucault's Corpus

Pleasure, desire, love. One might expect to find these as central concepts in Freud, but in Foucault!? In fact, a perusal of four different introductory overviews of Foucault's work (Sarah Mills, Davis R. Shumway, Alison Leigh Brown, and Johanna Oskala) turn up no entries on desire, love or pleasure. Moreover, one is hard-pressed to find any of these terms in the subject index of scholarly works on Foucault. Just as Michel Foucault himself worked through questions with themes that varied over the years, the reception of his work and the scholarship on Foucault has also had different foci: the first phase of his work focused on epistemological questions, and correspondingly scholars focused on questions of truth and knowledge, the second phase focused on issues of power and genealogies of social institutions and likewise, scholarship focused on power, bio-power and genealogy, the third phase of his work turned toward ethics and some Foucault scholars developed accounts of freedom, and ethics drawing on this later work. Of course, in each of these phases, both the range of Foucault's writings and the breadth of the scholarship about Foucault is much broader; for instance in the later phase of his work he also lectured about Antiquity and parrhesia, and many scholars have developed their accounts of ethics and critical thinking by re-thinking his relationship to Kant.

This paper focuses on exploring the concepts of pleasure, desire and love in Foucault's work. By Foucault's own description, his three volume series on the History of Sexuality was a genealogy of desire ("Culture of the Self," cassette, Foucault Archives). He was pursuing the question: "Why do we recognize ourselves as objects of desire and not agents/subjects of pleasure?" (Op. Cit.) The answer to this question is complex, and not completely answered by the first 3 volumes of the History of Sexuality (one wonders if it even would have been answered had he pursued his original plan to have more than 3 volumes). One thing that is clear from the way the question is framed is that the construction of both pleasure and desire are intimately connected to the concept of self and subjectivity. Foucault laments the fact that the discourse shifts from pleasure to desire post-Antiquity. He attributes this shift primarily to two things, Christianity and the focus on knowing and controlling one's own desires, and psychoanalytic discourse that sees desire as the "truth" about the self. The aim of this paper is to understand the place of pleasure, desire and love in Foucault's corpus and to explore the relations among these terms as well as their relationship to other central ideas in Foucault, such as subjectivity. I argue that though these terms remain relatively unexplored in the scholarship on Foucault they nonetheless have an important role in understanding his work, especially (but not only) his work on sexuality and the hermeneutics of the self.

**Chloë Taylor**

### Disciplinary Relations/Sexual Relations

This paper is part of a manuscript which explores the topic of sex crimes, sexualized power relations and sexual prohibitions from a feminist-inflected Foucauldian perspective, focusing on the examples of rape and statutory rape, pedophilia, teacher-student and doctor-patient relations, prostitution and pornography. The project's overall argument is that our current approaches (media coverage, legislation, public policy) with respect to sexual crime and prohibition tend towards the constitution and intensification of the very desires and acts that they set out to contain and control. This is because, as Foucault has shown, we have an inverted understanding of the manners in which power functions, and this is particularly true at the sites where sex and prohibition meet.

The paper that I would present in Baltimore is taken from a chapter that examines hierarchical sexual relations arising within what Foucault describes as disciplinary institutional settings, such as doctor/patient and teacher/student relations, and will focus on professor/student relationships in particular. It begins by surveying the kinds of arguments that are used to explain prohibitions on professor/student relations. Professors are frequently said to be *in loco parentis*, and parental power is, Foucault argues in *Psychiatric Power*, of a sovereign nature. Professors are said to "have" power over students, and to be exploiting this power by entering into sexual

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relations with students. Power is assumed to be something that some people possess and that others do not. It is thought to be clear who has power and who does not and this situation is thought to be stable and to function in a uni-directional and top-down manner.

I argue, however, that these discourses on professor/student relations tend to misunderstand the form of power that is at work. In Foucault's terms, we theorize these sexual relations using a model of sovereign power, rather than recognizing individuals in disciplinary institutions to be situated within disciplinary and thus dynamic, reciprocal, unpredictable and complex networks of power. I argue, however, that if we reconsider these relations in terms of discipline, we would recognize that sexual prohibitions within institutions such as the university are productive rather than repressive of sexual desire. Only once we understand these relations accurately may we begin to reflect clearly and strategically on the ethical questions which arise with respect to them. The final section of this paper will begin to explore these ethical questions from a Foucauldian perspective.

**Merritt Foy**

### **Tragic Knowledge and Sexual Violence—An Epistemology of Survival**

In their essay, "Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?" Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray offer a reading of sexual trauma narratives through the lens of Foucault's later works; they suggest that while survivor narratives have the potential to be disruptive and transformative, the threat these narratives pose is frequently absorbed by dominant discourses that construe survivors' claims as madness. Taking Alcoff and Gray's essay as a jumping off point, I propose an account of what it would mean to read survivor discourse as the speech of the mad in terms of Foucault's earlier work in *History of Madness*. Focusing on Foucault's theorization of tragic knowledge, I suggest that part of the threat posed by survivor narrative is the epistemological positioning that sexual trauma engenders. Drawing on both the experience of the tragic that Foucault locates in earlier accounts of madness as well as Susan Brison's and Dorothy Allison's work on sexual trauma survival, I identify several points at which survivor discourse disrupts dominant epistemological assumptions. As I will argue, tracing the contours of an epistemology of survival can thus help us to transform accusations of madness—meant to disarm and defuse survivor narrative—into a powerful recognition of an alternative epistemological positioning that undermines dominant conceptions of subjectivity, knowledge, truth, and temporality. And by pointing to weaknesses and fissures in broader networks of understanding, survivor narrative also provides a channel into wide-reaching questions about subjectivity and knowledge.